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INCOME TAX-Recovered Property Previously Deducted
Included in Gross Income in Year of RecoveryAlice Phelan, Sullivan Corp. v. United States*
In 1989 and 1940 the corporate taxpayer claimed as charitable
deductions the value of two parcels of realty which it had donated
to a charitable organization subject to the condition that they be
used solely for religious or educational purposes. Having decided
not to use the gifts in the manner specified, the donee reconveyed
them to the taxpayer in 1957. The taxpayer failed to reflect this
recovery in its gross income for that year. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, however, determined that under section 111 of
the 1954 Internal Revenue Code (Code) 1 the taxpayer's gross income
• CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (67-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) f 9570 (Ct. Cl. July 20,
1967) [hereinafter cited as principal case].
I. INT. REY. CoDE of 1954, § Ill. The taxpayer had received a tax: saving from the
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reported in its 1957 tax return should have included each piece of
recovered property valued as of the year of deduction. The taxpayer
paid a deficiency assessment and then sued for a partial refund of
this assessment in the Court of Claims, relying on that court's earlier
decision in Perry v. United States2 to establish that an overpayment
had been made to the extent that the taxes on the recovered property exceeded the actual tax savings from the charitable deductions
in 1939 and 1940.3 On a motion by the Commissioner for summary
judgment, held, Perry v. United States! is overruled and the taxpayer's petition is dismissed. To the extent that a taxpayer is able
to utilize a deduction to reduce his taxable income, a subsequent
recovery of the property giving rise to the deduction must be included in his gross income for the year of recovery and taxed at the
then current rates. By this decision, the Court of Claims conformed
its result on this issue to that of other courts which have faced the
same question. 6
There are two primary accounting approaches to the computation of income tax: the transactional method and the annual
method. The transactional accounting approach treats each transaction separately; thus, the income from each transaction is deterprior use of the realty as charitable deductions to which, in the light of the subse•
quent recovery of the realty, it is no longer entitled. To prevent unjust enrichment
of the taxpayer the benefit of such a deduction must be offset. Under § 111, the
usual method of adjustment is to include in gross income for the year of recovery
the amount of the prior deduction which was recovered, subject to the limitation
that any part of the deduction which did not result in a reduction of taxes in the
prior year is not included. See Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L.
R:Ev. 129, 176 (1943). Although § Ill refers only to recovery of "bad debts, prior taxes
and delinquency amounts," the Supreme Court in Dobson v. Commissioner, 820 U.S.
489 (1943), impliedly recognized that the rule was not restricted to these specific situations. The rule is now applied to the recovery of "all other losses, expenditures and
·accruals ••• made the basis of a deduction ••• ," Treas, Reg. § 1.111-l(a) (1956),
For leading articles on the tax benefit rule in general, see Plumb, The Tax Benefit
Rule Today, 57 HAllv. L. R.Ev. 129 (1943); Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Tomorrow,
57 HARV. L. R.Ev. 675 (1944); Tye, Tile Tax Benefit Rule Reexamined, 3 TA.-..:: L, REY.
329 (1948).
2. 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
3. The deductions taken in 1939 and 1940, were $4,248.49 and $4,463.44 respectively.
Since the tax rates then in effect were 18% (1939) and 24% (1940), the total tax saving
realized from the deductions was $1,877.49. The Commissioner included the full value
of each parcel as of the year it was donated, totalling $8,706.93, in the corporation's
income for 1957, which was taxed at a rate of 52%- The taxpayer contended that it
was liable only to the e.-..::tent of the tax saving in the prior year and thus claimed
a refund of $2,650.11-the deficiency assessment for 1957 of $4,527.60 less the prior
tax saving of $1,877.49. In effect, this method of adjustment taxes the income from
the recovered property at the rates applicable in the years the deductions were taken,
4. 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
5. See Estate of William H. Block, 39 B.T.A. 888 (1939), af/'d sub nom. Union Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, !Ill U.S. 658 (1940); National
Bank of Commerce, 40 B.T.A. 72 (1939), a/fd, 115 F.2d 875 (1940), 8 P-H 1967 Fm. TAX
SERv. 1J 8534, at 8501; l CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1J IUH.01, at 19,248.
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mined only upon completion of the transaction. 6 In contrast, under
the annual approach, taxable income is computed on the basis of
the income and expenses resulting from all of the taxpayer's transactions during a single year, including transactions not completed in
that year. The annual approach thus makes it possible to recognize
income in one year on a transaction that ultimately results in an
over-all loss. The Supreme Court in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks
Co.7 chose to adopt the annual accounting approach, apparently because of its comparative ease of application and its production of
revenue to the government at regular intervals. 8 Since the Burnet
decision, the concept of accounting for items of income on an annual basis has become firmly entrenched as a basic principle by
which the courts interpret and implement our tax laws.
The court in the principal case believed that the annual accounting principle dictated the inclusion of the value of the previously
deducted property in the gross income of the year of recovery. 9 How6. Bartlett v. Delaney, 173 F.2d 535, 536 (1st Cir. 1949), afj'g 75 F. Supp. 490 (D.
Mass. 1948), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 817 (1949).
7. 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
8. "It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue
ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a
system is it practical to produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of
accounting, assessment, and collection capable of practical operation." Id. at 365.
This was contrasted with the transactional method which would postpone "the assessment of the tax until the end of a lifetime, or some other indefinite period • • . ."
Id. Other e.xpressions of preference for the annual accounting principle as opposed
to the less definite transactional approach are abundant. See, e.g., Murray v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1956); Brown v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 66 (9th Cir.
1933), affd, 291 U.S. 193 (1934); F. B. Fawsett, 23 B.T.A. 1148, 1152 (1931), affd, 63
F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933). See also Surrey, Symposium on
Law and Accounting, 36 IowA L. REv. 191 (1950). Quasi-transactional methods which
attempt to superimpose the transactional theory upon the annual system of accounting
by requiring a prior return to be amended in light of subsequent events have also
been rejected by the courts on the grounds of administrative inconvenience and a
lack of finality in income tax liability. Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953);
Estate of William H. Block, 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), a/fd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940); Webster, The
Claim of Right Doctrine; 1954 Version, 10 TAX L. REv. 381 (1955); Surrey&: Warren,
The Income Tax Project of The American Law Institute: Gross Income, Deductions,
Accounting, Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66 HAR.v. L. REv. 761,
795 (1953).
9. "To insure the vitality of the single year concept, it is essential not only that
annual income be ascertained without reference to losses experienced in an earlier
accounting period, but also that income be taxed without reference to earlier tax
rates." Principal case at 84,847. At one time, the courts amended the prior return to
disallow the deduction where this was not precluded by the statute of limitations.
F. B. Elliott Co., 45 B.T.A. 82 (1941). But in Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944), the Supreme Court stated that the annual accounting
principle precluded the allocation of income to a year other than the year of actual
receipt (or, for an accrual basis taxpayer, the year in which the right to receive
income became final), and thereafter courts construed this to mean that such amendment was no longer possible even if the statute of limitations were not a bar. Lexmont
Corp., 20 T.C. 185 (1953); 2 J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 12.23, at
99 (1961).
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ever, this decision may be inequitable to the taxpayer whose ta.x.
rate has escalated, since he will have to pay more taxes because of
the _recovery than he saved by virtue of the deduction. 10 In Perry v.
United States,11 the Court of Claims had attempted to remedy this
inequity by ruling that the tax upon recovery of a previously deducted item should equal the actual reduction of tax liability in the
year the deduction was taken. This result insured that neither the
ta.x.payer nor the government would suffer as a result of the recovery.12 The rule adopted by the Perry court was quickly criticized as
violating the annual accounting principle.13 In the principal case,
the Court of Claims reacted to this criticism by overruling its decision in Perry and resurrecting the single year concept.14 It is submitted, however, that although incorrect as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the Perry rule is desirable in that it retains most of
the practical advantages of the annual accounting principle while
providing a more accurate reflection of the taxpayer's true income
position.
The Perry rule may be classified as transactional in approach,
since it does not look merely to the net results of a single year but
takes into account the total effect on income of a series of related
transactions. However, the additional administrative inconvenience
of applying that rule, as opposed to annual accounting rule, appears
to be slight. To illustrate, under section lll, when a previously
deducted item of property is recovered, possible tax liability is not
determined until after an examination of the prior return discloses
that the deduction resulted in a tax benefit to the taxpayer.111 This
10. Conversely, if the recovery is taxed at rates lower than those in effect when
the deduction was taken, the treatment would also be inequitable since the taxpayer
would be in a better position than it would have been in had it never taken the
deduction. See, e.g., Central Loan and Inv. Co., 39 B.T.A. 981 (1939).
11. 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958). For a discussion of the case, see Note, 1959
DUKE L.J. 151; Note, 33 TUL. L. REv. 247 (1958); Note, 16 WASH. &: LEE L. REv.
248 (1959).
12. Other methods similar to the Perry rule have been advocated and rejected.
American Dental Co., 44 B.T.A. 425 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 128 F.2d 254 (7th
Cir. 1942), affd, 318 U.S. 322 (1943); Central Loan and Inv. Co., 39 B.T.A. 981 (1939).
13. S. SURREY &: W. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 538 (1960); 1 J. MERTENS,
LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.37, at 99 (1962). See also note 11 supra. The
Commissioner refused to follow Perry, Rev. Rul. 141, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 17, and the
Court of Claims itself appeared hesitant to rely on Perry. Citizens Fed. Sav. &: Loan
Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
14. Principal case at 84,847.
15. For example, assume a taxpayer has a gross income of $15,000 in year 1, and
in addition has a deductible item valued at $20,000. Under the § 111 ta.x benefit rule,
if he recovers the item in year 2, only $15,000 would be included in his gross income
for year 2 since the remaining $5,000 did not result in a tax benefit (i.e., a reduction
in tax liability) in year 1. In other words, since only $15,000 of the $20,000 was
needed to reduce his taxable income in year 1 to zero, only $15,000 of the recovery
is taxed in year 2.
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initial determination must be made regardless of whether the Perry
rule or the rule of the principal case is followed; it is only after a
finding that some ta.'{ liability exists that the procedures differ. The
rule in the principal case would require inclusion of the entire value
of the recovered property in the gross income of the year of recovery,
if any tax benefit resulted from the prior deduction. Under the
Perry rule, however, the Commissioner would simply add the actual
ta.'X: saving produced by the deduction in the prior year to the tax
liability for the year of recovery computed without the inclusion
of the recovered item in gross income. 16 Thus, the Perry rule requires only the one additional calculation of the actual tax saving
in the prior year, which does not appear to be prohibitively inconvenient.
Moreover, the Perry rule does not force the government to wait
for an indefinite period before it realizes any tax revenue. While
the Perry rule may be regarded as transactional to the extent that
it is concerned with the over-all position of the taxpayer after two
or more related events, tax liability would still be predicated on
annual returns, and thus revenue payable to the government would
be produced at regular intervals. 17 In addition, since it requires
adjustment in the return for the year of recovery rather than the
year of deduction, the Perry rule overcomes the traditional objection
to "quasi transactional" approaches that they necessitate the reopening and amending of prior returns.18
Since the practical advantages of applying the rule of the principal case rather than the Perry rule appear slight, it seems strange
that the least equitable of the two should be the one adopted. The
court in the principal case apparently felt the need for explicit
legislative authorization to depart from the rule followed by other
courts.19 Given the court's inhibition, one might ask why, in the
16. It should be noted that this tax benefit rule is itself an exception to the annual
accounting principle. Using the same example as in note 15 supra, the Commissioner,
instead of following the Sullivan rule by adding the $15,000 to the tax.payer's gross
income in year 2, would determine the taxpayer's total tax liability for year 2 by
computing what the tax liability would have been in year l without using the deduction, and adding the difference between this amount and the actual tax liability for
year l computed with the deduction to the tax liability based on the taxpayer's gross
income in year 2 without the recovery. Thus, the taxpayer is taxed in year 2 only
to the extent of his actual tax saving in year I.
17. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
18. Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953); Estate of William H. Block, 39
B.T.A. 338 (1939), affd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, lll F.2d 60 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940); Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine; 1954
Version, 10 TAX L. REv. 381 (1955); Surrey & Warren, supra, note 8.
19. "And absent specific statutory authority sanctioning a departure from this
principle, it may only be said of Perry that it achieved a result which was more
equitably just than legally correct." Principal case at ,r 84,847. See also the court's footnote 5, appealing to Congress for codification of the Perry rule.
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face of the arguments that can be mustered in support of the Perry
rule, Congress has failed to sanction this exception to the singleyear concept.
When the tax benefit rule was originally adopted, Congress was
aware of the inequities involved in situations like that in the principal case, and, in fact, it rejected a proposed solution identical to
that found in Perry.20 In contrast, Congress did take action with
respect to a similar adjustment problem arising in the "claim of
right" context. Assume an employer mistakenly overpays his employee by $5,000 in year 1. In year 2, the employer discovers the
mistake and requires the taxpayer to return the extra $5,000. This
situation is similar to that in the principal case in that some adjustment must be made to reflect the change in the employee's income
position. In effect, he has paid taxes on $5,000 of income that he
was not permitted to retain. In United States v. Lewis,21 the Supreme
Court held that a taxpayer in this situation should deduct from
gross income in year 2 the amount which he was forced to return.
This result was not wholly satisfactory on the facts of Lewis, since
the taxpayer was taxed at a lower rate in year 2 and thus realized a
tax saving in that year which was less than the additional taxes originally paid when the item was included in gross income in year 1.22
Congress responded to the Lewis case by enacting section 1341
of the Code.23 Under this provision, if the tax saving produced by
20. I suggest, however, that the ta.x benefit rule should take the form, not of
limiting the amount of income to be reported in the year of recovery and then
taxing it at the rates applicable to such year, but of limiting the tax for such year
to the amount of tax saved by the prior deduction. This will more nearly square
with the real purpose of taxing such recoveries, which is to neutralize the benefits
derived from the prior deduction.
Statement of Ellsworth C. Alvord, Washington, D.C. Chairman, Committee on Fed•
eral Finance, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Hearings on H.R. 7378
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1784 (1942). See also id. at
1802. The subsequent committee report did not provide a reason for the failure of
Congress to adopt the proposed method. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
21. 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
22. The inequities of this procedure were again brought before the Court in Healy
v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953). The Court followed the Lewis decision emphasizing that such a result was necessitated by the annual accounting principle.
23. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1341. The pertinent part of this section provides:
(a) General rule-If(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or years)
because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such
item;
(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was established
after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did
not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such item;
and
(3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $3,000 then the tax imposed by this
chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the following:
(4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or
(5) an amount equal to(A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction minus
(B) the decrease in tax under this chapter (or the correspondi~g provisions of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year (or years) which
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the deduction in year 2 is less than the amount the tax liability was
increased in year 1 due to the improper inclusion of an item in
gross income, the tax for year 2 is computed without a deduction
for the item returned and the taxpayer then receives a credit against
the amount computed for the additional tax paid in year 1.24 The
similarity between this approach and the Perry rule is readily
apparent.
Congress has also remedied another inequity very similar to that
found in the principal case. If a taxpayer had deducted an amount
paid to a third party as a result of an adverse judgment in a patent
infringement suit, and subsequently recovers the amount because
the judgment is reversed, section 1342 of the Code25 operates to include the amount recovered in the gross income in the year of
recovery unless the increase in taxes due to the inclusion of the
recovery in gross income is greater than the prior tax saving realized
when the deduction was taken. In that event, the recovery is taxed
in much the same manner as under the Perry rule.26
would result solely from the exclusion of such item (or portion thereof)
from gross income for such prior taxable year (or years).
24. If in the hypothetical, the $5,000 subsequently returned was originally taxed
in year I at a rate of 30%, the additional tax would have been $1,500. But if the
rate in effect in year 2 is 20%, and if the $5,000 must be deducted in year 2, a tax
saving of only $1,000 will result. The government will be unjustly enriched by $500.
In this event, § 134l(a)(5) requires that $1,500-the additional tax in year I-be
applied as a credit against the tax liability in year 2, computed without the $5,000
deduction.
Note that if the rates were reversed, under § 1341 the Lewis rule would still be
applied and the taxpayer would deduct the item at the higher tax rate in year 2.
Thus, the original tax in year 1 would have been $1,000, but the deduction in the
year 2 would produce a $1,500 tax saving allowing the taxpayer a $500 windfall. The
Code does not take into account this possible inequity to the government and unjust
enrichment of the taxpayer, and in this respect the Perry rule would appear superior.
25. INT. RE:v. CoDE of 1954, § 1342. The pertinent part of this section provides:
(a) General rulc-1£(1) an item was deducted from gross income for a prior taxable year (or years)
because it appeared that another person held an unrestricted right to such
item as a result of a court decision in a patent infringement suit (whether
or not the taxpayer is a party to such suit); and
(2) gross income is increased for the taxable year because it was established
after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that such other person
did not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such
item because of the subsequent reversal of such court decision on the
ground that such decision was induced by fraud or undue influence; and
(3) the amount of such increase in gross income exceeds $3,000, then the tax
imposed by this chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the
folfowing:
(4) the ta.x for the taxable year computed with the gross income so increased;
or
(5) an amount equal to(A) the tax for the ta.xable year computed without such increase in gross
income, plus
(B) the increase in tax (including interest) under this chapter (or the corresponding provisions of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year
(or years) which would result solely from the elimination of such item
(or portion thereof) as a deduction from gross income for such prior
taxable year (or years).
26. For instance, if the recovery in the principal case was covered by § 1342, the
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There is no apparent reason for the failure of Congress to legislate the Perry approach. 27 In the past, Congress has enacted provisions to mitigate the harsh results of a strict application of the
annual accounting principle in a variety of situations.28 Enactment
of sections 1341 and 1342 shows that Congress does not feel constrained by the annual accounting principle in situations similar
to that of the principal case. In fact, the tax benefit rule 20 is itself
an exception to the annual accounting principle, designed to provide a more equitable solution to the problem of taxing the recovery
of property previously deducted. 30 However, as illustrated by the
principal case, inequities may still result. By adopting the Perry
rule, Congress would not only eliminate these remaining inequities,
but also extend the reasoning behind the tax benefit rule to its
logical conclusion.31
contention of the taxpayer would have been sustained. However, under § 1342, if the
increase in tax due to the inclusion of the recovery in gross income is less than the
tax saving realized when the deduction was taken in effect the rule of the principal
case is applied. The ta.xpayer would then still retain a tax saving to which he has no
equitable claim. Again, it would seem that the Perry rule is superior since it takes
into account the equities of both the government and the taxpayer and insures that
neither will receive an unintended ta.x benefit.
27. It could be argued that the additional inconvenience necessitated by the Perry
rule precludes its adoption. However, as pointed out above, any additional administrative inconvenience does not seem to be prohibitive. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. In any event, it would seem that the equitable advantages of the Perry
rule would counterbalance most objections based on convenience. See Surrey 8:
·warren, supra note 8. If it is felt that such objections present a serious obstacle to
the adoption of the Perry rule, application of the Sullivan rule could be retained in
situations where the recovery is small and has a minor impact on the taxpayer's income position while providing for application of the Perry rule only in those situations where the recovery produces a significant impact on the ta.xpayer's income
position. This result could be reached by imposing a requirement, similar to that
found in § 1342, that the recovery must produce an increase in gross income more
than $3,000 before the Perry rule would be applied. Perhaps it might also be argued,
if one is to assume that the general trend of tax rates is upward, that adoption of
the Perry rule will result in a decrease in tax revenue to the government. But, this
argument loses much of its force when it is recognized that the revenue lost is that
to which the government does not hold an equitable claim, and, in effect, its retention
under the Sullivan rule is a form of unjust enrichment.
28. For a list of other provisions of the Code-aside from §§ 1341 and 1342which take exception to the principle, see Note, 1959 DuKE L.J. 151, 153, n.15.
29. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § lll.
30. See Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REv. 129, 176 (1943).
31. The American Law Institute (ALI) has also proposed that the present method
be discarded. Their alternative would include the full amount of the recovery in
gross income for the year of recovery. However, if the item is in excess of either
$2,000 or 20% of the current net income, the taxpayer has the option of excluding
the recovery and amending the prior return to disallow the deduction. ALI Fm.
INCOME TAX STAT. §§ X332, X333 (Feb. 1954 Draft). It would appear, however, that
in two respects the Perry rule is superior to this proposal. First, the Perry rule insures
that both the taxpayer and the govenment will receive equitable treatment while
the ALI proposal still leaves a possibility that the government will receive inequitable
treatment. In addition, by requiring all adjustments in the current year, the Perry
rule escapes the difficulties of reopening and amending the prior return.

